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BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME? 
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
AND VIRTUES. James E. Fleming1 and Linda C. 
McClain.2 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
2013. Pp. 371. $49.95 (Cloth). 
Ken I. Kersch' 
"Can liberalism still tell powerful stories?" asked the 
intellectual historian and political theorist Eldon Eisenach in a 
recent essay.4 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the progenitors of the contemporary American 
liberal/left-Populists, proponents of the Social Gospel, and 
Progressives-met and beat the era's powerful legal and political 
conservatism with appeals to justice, equality, and a "new" 
freedom, not as abstract concepts, but made through telling 
stir~ing stori~s about the country's ?i~toric~l traJectory. as a 
nation, and Its progress toward Chnstlan virtue.· The hberal 
Democratic triumph and establishment of a governing regime, 
however, coincided with the subsequent outbreak of the Second 
World War and then the Cold War. Both called into sharp 
question some of the main lines of the Populist and Progressive 
Era's proto-liberalism, including its breast-beating nationalism, 
its attraction to mass democracy, and, in domestic politics, its 
aggressively theological us-versus-them substantive commit-
ments. Liberals, now in control of all branches of the national 
government (and most of the state governments), had no 
intention of retreating from any of their substantive policy 
1. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate 
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
2. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University 
School of Law. 
3. Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College. 
4. Eldon J. Eisenach, Can Liberalism Still Tell Powerful Stories?, 11 THE 
EUROPEAN LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS 47 (2006). 
5. See, e.g., HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909); 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM (1910); WOODROW WILSON, THE 
NEW FREEDOM (1913). 
407 
408 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:407 
commitments. But many started talking about those commit-
ments~ and justifying them, in new ways they believed to be 
better suited to the ambient intellectual and political context. In 
an age of liberal dominance, the commitment to the science of 
society and value neutrality became the new gold-standard in the 
thought and rhetoric of politics, public policy~ and law.6 
In his account of these developments, Eisenach argued that 
the decision of mid-twentieth century American liberals to make 
a commitment to neutral principles the cornerstone of their 
understanding of liberal democracy had three major effects. 
First, it gave preference in political and legal discourse to 
apodictic claims of individual right~ as against an alternative 
understanding that the nature and scope of rights was to be 
determined politically, with the end of achieving common public 
purposes. This preference, in turn, underwrote the notion that 
courts were the polity's preeminent~ and only reliable, "forum of 
principle." This served to redirect progressive/liberal reform out 
away from electoral politics and into the courts to an historically 
unprecedented degree. Second, it moved liberals away from the 
kinds of nationalist and patriotic visions referencing a common 
past and dreaming of a common, and better, future into legalistic 
and quasi-philosophical arguments about neutral principles of 
justice and fairness, to be applied by appropriately schooled 
judges. Third, these developments created a "narrative vacuum" 
which~ should they seize the opportunity, the conservative 
opposition could fill anew with their own nationalist, religious, 
and patriotic visions-which, by the 1970s, conservatives have 
done. American liberalism has been on the defensive ever since. 
It is precisely as this night fell on liberal dominance in 
American politics that two resplendent Owls of Minerva took 
flight: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice ~1971) and Ronald 
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977). While armies of 
brainy Rawlsian political theorists and Dworkinian jurisprudes 
moved towards consolidating their Ivory Tower empires, 
conservatives reconstructed American politics, public policy, and 
constitutional thought. These two sophisticated, subtle, and 
6. Eisenach, supra note 4, at 60; see also DA YID A. HOLLINGER, SCIENCE, JEWS, 
AND SECULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1996); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 
(1973); Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for 
Studying Cross-National Influence Through Negative Models, 1 I-CON 296 (2003). 
7. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977): JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1971). 
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soporific tomes certainly kindled enthusiasm amongst careerists 
in the groves of academe. But their all-but-storyless, a-political, 
ostensibly neutral, and maddeningly abstracted exposition left 
others cold. As liberalism's substitution of philosophical for 
narrative coherence, Eisenach concluded, "came liberalism's loss 
of the capacity to mobilize national majorities for common 
ends."~ While Rawls and Dworkin may not be fully responsible 
for this these developments, they contributed to it in a major 
way, and epitomized it. 
James Fleming and Linda McClain's new contribution to 
American constitutional theory, Ordered Liberty: Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Virtues bears all the marks of the 
Rawlsian/Dworkinian project: the Harvard imprint, the title 
pitched at a stratospheric level of abstraction (with its attendant 
promise to unite us all through consensus over the best and 
highest principles), and the presentation in the voice of the royal 
"we" (which makes it sound like Ronald Dworkin speaking ex 
cathedra, but here can be attributed to the book's provenance as 
a team effort). Ordered Liberty is meant to be a major 
intellectual event, announcing a new direction for Rawlsian/ 
Dworkinian constitutional thought. "Our constitutional 
liberalism" (for which the authors frequently substitute the term 
"constitutional liberalism" tout court) proposes an intricately 
negotiated Pax Acadernia between liberal constitutional 
theorists typically held to be uncompromising champions of 
autonomy and rights as aggressively enforced by courts and civic 
republican, communitarian, and conservative political theorists 
and legalists (like Michael Sandel, Mary Ann Glendon, Cass 
Sunstein, and others) who insist that politics and law be less 
about the judicial enforcement of (speculative/broadly defined) 
abstract right in the name of the autonomous individual and 
more about the valuing of the claims of concrete, locally and 
historically-constituted associations and communities, with a 
focus on responsibility, morality, and virtue. Put otherwise, they 
propose through an act of grand theoretical synthesis, to bring 
the liberal-communitarian debate to a close. 
Amongst American historians, that debate, under the guise 
of liberalism versus republicanism, was brought (more or less) to 
a close some time ago. Not so, apparently in political and legal 
theory, where, while it still might be for this world, is 
nevertheless, by now, getting quite long in the tooth. One fears 
8. Eisenach, supra note 4, at 60. 
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that, in the realm of political theory, its terms might be 
perpetual, as the debate goes to the heart of what Duncan 
Kennedy has called the "fundamental contradiction" of 
liberalism- that "relations with others are both necessary and 
incompatible with our freedom." This is the dilemma of 
individual versus collective self-determination.9 Yet, historically, 
even in the realm of theory, it seems that a modus vivendi has 
been arrived at, at least within American constitutional law. As 
Fleming and McClain themselves explicitly and systematically 
demonstrate, a liberal-communitarian rapprochement is, and has 
long since, been practiced both on the Supreme Court (and, 
perhaps more importantly for mankind, in his most recent work, 
by the late Ronald Dworkin himself). Yet another Owl, it seems, 
has taken flight. 
Since both the Supreme Court and Ronald Dworkin have 
been speaking prose all along, Ordered Liberty appears to be 
aimed primarily at the understandings of conten:tporary liberal 
constitutional theory by communitarian scholars (who have yet 
to notice these on-the-ground developments), and by con-
servatives (who have a vested interest in insisting, as against all 
evidence, that all (selfish) liberals care about are the vindication 
of their individual constitutional rights- morals and the broader 
public good be damned). Ordered Liberty at the very least brings 
these people up-to-date, and shows them up, which is no small 
service, and contribution. 
Who are these liberals, Fleming and McClain ask, who care 
nothing for the common good, and only for autonomy, who 
spurn liberty for the pleasures of license? Wilth the single 
exception of Roe v. Wade (1973) (which was reversed in relevant 
part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)), the authors argue, 
a hell-bent liberalism committed to pure autonomy has never 
guided the Supreme Court in its major decisions involving 
individual liberty (or Ronald Dworkin in his cogitations ). 10 Both 
sides in the liberal-communitarian debate had and have valid 
points, which have long-since been synthesized (viz. liberty 
matters, and so does community). If a problem retnains, it is not 
9. See Howard Gillman, The Antinomy of Public Purposes and Private Rights in 
the American Constitutional Tradition, or Why Communitarianism is Not Necessarily 
Exogenous to Liberal Constitutionalism, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 67 (1996) (citing Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 
1737 (1976)); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 
BUFF. L. REV. 205,210-13 (1979). 
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505 
u.s 833 (1992). 
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with liberals-they have met communitarians half-way-but 
with the communitarians themselves (particularly the liberal 
Democratic ones), many of whom refuse to stand up and say 
when they are willing to recognize critical constitutional rights. 
In advocating their new framework, Fleming and McClain 
recur to the work of political theorists Stephen Macedo and 
William Gals ton, who- in books with titles all but indis-
tinguishable fron1 Fleming and McClain's-have been working 
to integrate considerations of virtue into the liberal political 
framework for over two decades. 11 Even Ronald Dworkin, we 
are told, hardly precluded consideration of the common good 
from his arguments, even for rights as trumps (the metaphor 
implies, Fleming and McClain say, that there are other cards on 
the table). Through what they describe as a "synthesis of 
liberalism, civic republicanism, and feminism" extending the 
arguments of Dworkin, Fleming and McClain propose what they 
hold to be "the most defensible ordering of rights, 
responsibilities, and virtues in the American constitutional 
order" (p. 3). 
Central to their framework is the proposal of a "formative 
project for constitutional liberalism" (p. 115). By this purported 
"third way," government would act to cultivate and encourage 
responsible decisionmaking by rights-bearing individuals. Rather 
than being relativistic, agnostic, or non-judgmental about the 
substantive choices individuals make, Fleming and McClain's 
constitutional liberalism would defer to those choices out of 
(substantive) respect. In the authors' model, government would 
concern itself with the formation of reflective, responsible 
individuals who act in a way that is worthy of respect-with 
forging the conditions for the responsible exercise of a 
deliberative autonomy (or liberal virtue). The authors' 
framework rests on a distinction they draw between two types of 
responsibility: responsibility as accountability (to community) 
versus responsibility as autonomy (or self-government). With the 
former, the actor is "answerable to others for the manner and 
consequences of exercising one's rights." With the latter, he or 
she is trusted "to exercise moral responsibility in making 
decisions guided by conscience and deliberation." In this way, 
"constitutional liberalism aspires to secure the preconditions for 
11. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: 
CiTIZENSHIP, VIRTUES, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). 
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ordered liberty, not liberty without responsibilities"; it does not 
countenance indifference to matters of the collective public good 
(pp. 6-7). 
All this is sensible enough. But, as always, when dealing 
with the characteristic abstractions of this literature, I'm never 
quite sure what is at stake-or how. Since when has the 
government evinced no concern for how people exercised their 
rights, or, in a broad sense, have such concerns been rendered 
off-limits? And since when has a commitment to "dignity," 
"autonomy," "equal concern and respect," or "the comtnon 
good" ever decided a concrete case as a logical deduction from 
principle? To those who intuitively share Fletning and McClain's 
feelings about what dignity and respect require, their deductions 
from principle (like those of Rawls and Dworkin) will seem 
ineluctable. To others, they are non sequiturs. 
The issue is raised in the book's very title, with its proud 
commitment to "ordered liberty. " 12 This phrase itself is worth 
pausing over. It might be abstract, but it is hardly without 
content. There is certainly such a thing as liberty without order, 
which is either anarchy or license (though some would dispute 
the application of the word "liberty" to such a state). One can 
also imagine a ''disordered liberty'' -perhaps a liberty with some 
kind of order, but one that is either random or erratic in its 
protections, or out of harmony with any appropriate conception 
of the good. Order without liberty would to most of us connote 
tyranny. And disorder without liberty is a tooth-and-claw 
Hobbesian state of nature. "Ordered liberty" --liberty under 
law- is thus a useful, and real, concept. That said, though, within 
free societies, it is a consensus commitment. 13 When applied to 
describe an intricately theorized and specified constitutional 
theory like Fleming and McClain's, or to resolve almost any 
concrete, hotly-dispute case in the U.S. Suprerne Court, how 
much work can the concept actually do? 
This is illustrated by the most prominent uses of the phrase 
in twentieth century American law and politics. Law professors 
will immediately recognize it as Justice Cardozo's from his 
celebrated double-jeopardy opinion in Palko v. Connecticut 
(1937). 14 Students of American political thought, however, will 
12. Or what John Rawls. with his characteristic brio, called ··a well-ordered 
society." RAWLS, supm note 7. at 453. 
13. Ordered Liherty's apt epigraph is Locke's famous statement in his Second 
Treatise on Civil Government that "where there is no law, there is no freedom .. , 
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
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recognize it the phase used earlier by the President who 
appointed Cardozo to the High Court, Herbert Hoover, in an 
equally well-known 1928 campaign speech on "Rugged 
Individualism." Like Fleming, McClain, and Cardozo. Hoover 
counted himself a staunch proponent of "ordered liberty"-
while denouncing government interference with business, 
socialism, paternalism, and bureaucracy (is this what John Rawls 
calls an "overlapping consensus"?).'-' But, then again, for all 
practical purposes, so what? Herbert Hoover's America and 
Fleming and McClain's America would be very different places. 
And those differences might very well track those that divide 
liberals from conservatives in contemporary (constitutional) 
politics. These are two very different "ordered liberties." 
Between the idea and the reality falls the shadow. 
In their demonstration that we all now share a commitment 
to the Court's role in securing "ordered liberty," Fleming and 
McClain, in a chapter entitled "The Myth of Strict Scrutiny for 
Fundamental Rights," survey recent landmark Supren1e Court 
decisions involving claims of (substantive) due process liberty. 
They find that, in fact, the (mid-to-late twentieth century liberal, 
activist) Court has always related claims of autonomy to the 
well-being of the collective interests of society. This raises two 
questions: First, is it true? Second, if it is true, so what? 
Is it true? As legal scholars, Fleming and McClain apply 
their Rawlsian abstractions to concrete cases. In doing so, the 
authors devote most of their attention to two kinds of cases. The 
first involve questions of family and parental rights (especially 
those involving the counterclaims of religion and the state-such 
as those well-worn toys in the Rawlsian sandbox, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins)."' The second involve the Court's 
(substantive) due process liberty decisions involving bodily 
(mostly sexual and reproductive) autonomy. Given these pre-
occupations, the case of gay rights-and of gay families in 
15. Specifically, Hoover (who elsewhere proclaimed himself ''an unashamed 
individualist") said that "By adherence to the principles of decentralized self-
government, ordered liberty. equal opportunity. and freedom to the individual, our 
American experiment in human welfare has yielded a degree of well-being unparalleled 
in the world. It has come nearer to the abolition of poverty. to the abolition of fear of 
want, than humanity has ever reached before ... Herbert Hoover, Rugged Individualism, 
in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A NORTON ANTHOLOGY 1140 (Isaac Kramnick 
and Theodore J. Lowi eds., 2009). See JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005); 
RAWLS, supra note 7. 
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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particular-represents something of a perfect storm (despite its 
abstracted title, much of Ordered Liberty is devoted to discussing 
gay rights). 
The book's very substantive timeliness in this regard, 
however, can distract us from questions of selection bias. As for 
the first type of case, where schools and families are front and 
center, it is not hard, should it be deemed rhetorically helpful, to 
rustle up a claim for community that yields the same "liberal"17 
result coughed up pursuant to an argument from autonomy. As 
for the second, although sounding doctrinally in questions of 
liberty, they are clearly (also) cases involving group or caste 
equality (women, gays and lesbians). These types of cases are 
thus ripe for re-description as implicating serious questions of 
the public good, responsibility, citizenship, and virtue. The 
problem is that these two types of cases are only a small part of 
"rights revolution" cases that conservatives and communitarians 
criticize for being overly solicitous of claims anchored in 
arguments about autonomy. Where, I wondered, was the 
discussion of the claims of autonomy in cases involving, say, a 
jacket that says "Fuck the Draft," flag-burning, nude-dancing, 
the possession of pornographic films, cross-burning, hateful 
disruptive protests at military funerals, the banning of violent 
video games, the aggressive defense of criminal process rights, 
including aggressive assertions of the Fifth Amendment in cases 
involving charges of domestic subversion, etc. ?1s -How do these 
types of cases fit into Fleming and McClain's framework 
emphasizing the creation of the conditions of "deliberative 
autonomy"? Right-wing communitarians like Mary Ann 
Glendon and Sarnuel Ali to are more than happy to take on these 
issues. They argue that in these areas there is too nauch attention 
to rights, and not enough to the claims o:f community. 
Liberal/Left communitarians (and liberal liberals ostensibly 
moving to meet them halfway, like Fleming and McClain), 
however, are quite skittish about lingering over those types of 
issues. Why? Because, I would venture, in these cases, while one 
can certainly theorize one's way to the conclusion that it is in the 
community's best interest to afford constitutional protection to 
17. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
18. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010); Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 
(1991 ); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Viii. of 
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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Nazis taunting Auschwitz survivors or Klansmen parading and 
burning crosses, in these sorts of cases, claims of autonomy do 
the lion's share of the work to guide the Court to a (politically) 
liberal result in a (politically) plausible way. 19 The selection bias 
in Ordered Liberty (and similar scholarly endeavors) 
systematically draws attention away from the areas of civil 
liberties law where arguments about creating the conditions for 
responsible deliberative autonomy and full citizenship for 
unjustly oppressed (but, it is implied, morally noble) groups is 
likely to run up hardest against liberal (that is, contemporary 
Democratic Party) political commitments. The types of civil 
liberties cases that Ordered Liberty sidesteps do not (in any 
immediate way) involve the sort of cognitive formation that is at 
the heart of Fleming and McClain's foundational concept of 
"deliberative autonomy" (in the way that schools cases like 
Wisconsin v. Yoder- the case that has launched a thousand 
Rawlsian ships-does). Fleming and McClain's model for the 
reconciliation of liberty and community in due process liberty 
cases, moreover, does not work as well when despised groups are 
involved, so the authors are pretty much silent on cases involving 
them (that is why we have an ACLU). Indeed, their framework, 
as a matter of history, does not work very well for the same 
groups they do discuss, so long as those groups remain broadly 
despised or devalued by society (yet another indication that this 
book is most decidedly a strategic bid to sell liberalism in a 
conservative era). Fleming and McClain's constitutional 
liberalism can play its part effectively only at a very particular 
and identifiable time in constitutional development. In areas like 
women's reproductive liberty and gay rights, strong autonomy 
claims- made without reference to the common good- are no 
longer needed today. But they were either needed, or inevitable, 
in earlier stages of the fight for civil rights and liberties, when 
members of despised and oppressed out-groups worked up the 
courage to first claim their rights. In the U.S., rights-talk has 
been rallying talk: always has been, always will be. It is certainly 
a critical part of American culture, nationalism, and patriotism-
that is, of American stories, right and left.20 The initial demand 
19. This is not to say that even extreme defenses of individual autonomy in free 
speech cases could not be theoretically justified in public good terms. Free speech theory 
has no problem claiming that affording maximum autonomy to speech advances the 
public good. The problem then collapses, of course. While they are nice in theory, these 
theories have a hard time flying politically, since they involve a relatively abstract and 
sophisticated constitutional theodicy. 
20. I consider Mary Ann Glendon a European, not an American thinker. 
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for individual freedom (self-determination) through aggressive, 
non-relational, rights-talk is often critical for forging the identity, 
the self-conception-the pride-of members of social 
movements daring to act publicly as agents to assert their rights. 
While such defiant, assertive claims of entitlernent to one's 
individual rights may seem, as a matter of political theory, like a 
claim to pure autonomy, individuals who make such claims are, 
paradoxically, in so doing, enrolling themselves in the scrolls of 
the collective American national story. The United States is the 
country in which the individual, through the proud assertion of 
his autonomy, is dissolved into something complete and great. 
This is, indeed, "the pursuit of happiness." 
To be sure, it becomes easier over time, as a matter of 
psychology and then of political rhetoric and theory, for the 
shock troops of social movements demanding full citizenship and 
equality to focus on their commonalities with others, and the 
ways in which their freedom harmonizes with the freedom of all. 
Once a minimal level of autonomy is claimed and found- once 
enough autonomy is gained so that members of oppressed 
groups can stand on their own feet as self-determining agents-
we are ripe for arguments that their freedoms are consonant 
with the broader public good.21 In this temporal, developmental 
trajectory, the fabrication of a liberal constitutional theory 
reconciling individual liberty with the claims of co1mmunity is the 
last stage in the process, a mopping-up operation .. It is a bid for 
the institutionalization of movement politics through its 
absorption into law, which, in the end is only as stable as it is 
understood to advance the collective public good (salus populi 
suprema lex est). In this regard, we should understand Fleming 
and McClain's hook as a bid, after long hard struggle, to bring it 
all back ho1ne. 
As Dworkinians, Fleming, and McClain's road home, of 
course, runs through the reasoning of federal judges, who are to 
properly apply the authors' proposed "perfectionist" theory to 
concrete constitutional cases. Interestingly, and notably, their 
hero here is not William 0. Douglas or even William J. Brennan 
(that is for those pony-tailed, old-school ACLU types) but the 
second Justice John Marshall Harlan. Harlan's approach to 
21. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LFGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Reva B. 
Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution .from a Social Movement Perspective, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
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deciding civil liberties cases was distinctive in its refusal to follow 
the modern frameworks of analysis for those cases developed 
during the New Deal ascendency. 
In Ordered Liberty, Fleming and McClain do not recount 
this history- which means that they don't set the context for the 
uses to which Cardozo put the concept of "ordered liherty" in 
his famous Palko opinion. There, Cardozo used it to distinguish 
between cases implicating those provisions of the Bill of Rights 
which are fundamental ("i1nplicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty") and thus slated for application to the states by through 
"absorption" (what we call "incorporation") via the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and those which are not. 
Cardozo's use of the concept represented an early and critical 
step in what later became known as the "Preferred Freedoms" 
doctrine- the notion that some rights are so fundamental that 
they would be aggressively enforced at the national level by 
courts as a matter of constitutional law (rights). This marked a 
clear departure from the traditional, highly deferential 
nineteenth century "bad tendency" framework for rights 
enforcement, in which state determinations of the advancement 
of the common good, through the exercise of their police powers 
and other residual powers (see the Tenth Amendment) were left 
more or less untouched by the federal judiciary (community).22 
There was mutual adjustment of the claims of right and claims of 
community under this regime, too. But the claims of community 
were plainly weighted much more heavily.23 
In their chapter on "The Myth of Strict Scrutiny for 
Fundamental Rights," Fleming and McClain pooh-pooh the 
tiers-of-scrutiny framework that was a direct outgrowth of, and 
the doctrinal embodiment of, the preferred freedoms approach 
to fundamental rights. That framework ostensibly placed funda-
mental rights claims on a plane all but impervious to regulation 
(Gerald Gunther's "strict in theory, fatal in fact"). 24 But, Fleming 
and McClain argue, after surveying the Court's (recent) 
substantive due process liberty decisions, in spite of this 
22. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
23. See LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE 
SHAW (1957); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The 
Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties 
Jurisprudence, 47 POLITICAL RES. Q. 623 (1994). 
24. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
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architecture, the Court has not been following it: like Justice 
Harlan, who never subscribed to this framework, it has been 
weighing rights against the collective good all along. 
If you have kept your eye on the ball that Fleming and 
McClain are pitching you might not pause to reflect that, 
historically and theoretically the tiers framework was closely 
related not only to the question of uncabined judicial discretion 
(not a big concern for Dworkinians, but a very big concern to 
Progressives and New Dealers like Hugo Black),25 but also to the 
question of whether the Bill of Rights was applicable to the 
states. In spurning one, we undercut the theoretical foundations 
of the other, since that framework too (as Palko suggests) was 
anchored in the understanding of some rights, as a matter of 
constitutional architecture, as being fundamental or "'preferred." 
This was quite clear to Justice Harlan, who famously insisted-
though Fleming and McClain never mention it-that the federal 
courts give the states significantly more leeway in interpreting 
the Bill of Rights than they would afford the federal govern-
ment. Although he certainly was willing to come down on the 
side of rights in individual circumstances (he has lots of street-
erect amongst contemporary liberals for his friendliness to 
privacy rights claims in the contraception case of Poe v. 
Ullman ),2(, Harlan was big on deference to the community, 
speaking through its elected representatives in Congress or the 
states, even in cases involving rights. He eschewed bright-line 
doctrinal rules, preferring (like his predecessor liberal/ 
conservative/rights-problematic predecessor Felix Frankfurter) 
to judge the fundamentalness of rights for purposes of judicial 
protection and incorporation on a case-by-case basis. As we 
drain the tub of the tiers-of-scrutiny bathwater, we would do 
well to keep a close eye on our babies. 
Fleming and McClain heap special praise on Harlan for 
rejecting and confounding dichotomies, for being "at once 
progressive and conservative" (p. 197). They like his thoughtful 
balancing. As for where the balancing point should be in an un-
tiered framework that makes no institutional commitment to 
stacking the deck in favor of judicial activism or restraint, or the 
claims of right as against those of community, it remains far from 
clear. The authors argue, of course, that, in the latter case, if 
25. See MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, 
HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING ( 1984 ). 
26. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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conceptualized properly, the two are one (and liberal Democrats 
get all they want, constitutionally, to boot). But Fleming and 
McClain's argument for precisely how this is so is based on their 
analysis of a subset of constitutional cases whose selection is 
both theoretically and historically skewed to support their thesis. 
These cases do not effectively speak to the full universe of civil 
liberties concerns. 
Fleming and McClain's long-awaited reconciliation of the 
claims of order, liberty, rights, responsibility, and virtue depends 
upon the avoidance (or minimizing) of these cases and the 
obfuscation (or elision) of this history. The book strains toward a 
new liberalism that has once again gotten right with America. In 
so doing, it is in perfect harmony with the moment-and, I am 
afraid, the contemporary liberal predicament. 
